We propose Zeno, a new robust aggregation rule, for distributed synchronous Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) under a general Byzantine failure model. The key idea is to suspect the workers that are potentially malicious, and use a rankingbased preference mechanism. This allows us to generalize beyond past work-in our case, the number of malicious workers can be arbitrarily large, and we use only the weakest assumption on honest workers (at least one honest worker). We prove the convergence of SGD under these scenarios. Empirical results show that Zeno outperforms existing approaches under various attacks.
Introduction
Distributed machine learning is widely used for accelerating the model training. As the number of workers gets larger, the distributed system becomes more vulnerable to various kinds of failures or even attacks [7] . For this reason, fault tolerance in distributed settings has attracted increasing attention in the machine-learning community [1, 2, 4, 6, 17, 18, 19, 20] . In certain distributed settings, such as federated learning [9, 10] and volunteer computing [14, 16] , the workers/contributors can be unreliable. The computation nodes can be personal mobile devices or denoted personal computers/workstations. The attackers and unreliable workers can upload poisonous updates to the aggregated machine-learning models. Thus, failure/attack resilience in distributed machine-learning systems is now becoming increasingly important.
We study the fault tolerance of the Parameter Server (PS) architecture for distributed synchronous stochastic gradient descent (SGD). In the PS architecture, the processes are composed of the server nodes and the worker nodes. In each SGD iteration, the workers pull the latest model from the servers, estimate the gradients using the local portion of the training data, and send the gradient estimators to the servers. The servers aggregate the gradient estimators, update the model by using the aggregated gradients, and broadcast the latest model to the workers.
Based on the PS architecture, we consider the most general failure model, namely Byzantine failures [12] . Here the malicious workers know the entire system, and are allowed to behave arbitrarily. Typically, the number of Byzantine workers is assumed to be smaller than the number of non-Byzantine ones [1, 2, 4, 17, 19, 20] . In contrast, we require only the weakest assumption that there is at least one non-Byzantine worker. Furthermore, the Byzantine workers can collude. The group of Byzantine gradients can behave similarly to the correct gradients in the variance, and magnitude, which makes them less distinguishable from the correct ones.
We study the Byzantine resilience of synchronous SGD with weak assumptions on the number of Byzantine workers. To achieve this flexibility, we treat each candidate gradient estimator as a suspect. We compute a score using a stochastic first order oracle which indicates how trustworthy the given worker is. Then, we take the average over the several candidates with the highest scores. In summary, the main contributions of this paper are listed below:
• We propose a new aggregation rule for synchronous SGD with provable convergence when there is at least one non-Byzantine worker. The convergence is as fast as SGD. The variance is reduced when the number of non-Byzantine workers increases. The time complexity is also theoretically low. As far as we know, this paper is the first to theoretically and empirically study the cases where there are more Byzantine workers than non-Byzantine ones. • We show experimentally that the existing majority-based algorithms may fail, even when there are fewer Byzantine workers than non-Byzantine ones. These results elucidate the failure modes of recent published approaches. Furthermore, we show that our suspicion-based algorithm can handle such cases.
Related work
The robust estimator of the mean is a well-studied topic in statistics [8] . The idea of robust statistics is also applied to machine learning in Byzantine settings. For example, Chen et al. [4] , Su and Vaidya [17, 18] use geometric median as the aggregation rule. Yin et al. [20] establishes statistical error rates for marginal trimmed mean as the aggregation rule.
There are also robust gradient aggregation rules that are not based on robust statistics. For example, Blanchard et al. [2] , Mhamdi et al. [15] propose Krum and its variants, which select the candidates with minimal local sum of Euclidean distances.
Alistarh et al. [1] propose a Byzantine-resilient SGD variant different from the robust aggregation rules. The algorithm utilizes the historical information, and achieves the optimal sample complexity. However, the algorithm requires the estimated upper bound of the variances of the stochastic gradients, which makes the algorithm less practical. Furthermore, there are no empirical results provided.
Damaskinos et al. [5] consider a different scenario, where the distributed training is asynchronous. The proposed algorithm, Kardam, utilizes the Lipschitzness of the loss function to filter out the outliers. However, such an algorithm still relies on the majority rule, which requires the number of Byzantine workers less than one-third of the total number of workers.
In summary, the existing majority-based methods for synchronous SGD [1, 2, 4, 17, 19, 20] assume that the non-Byzantine workers dominates the entire set of workers. Thus, such algorithms can trim the outliers from the candidates. However, in real-world attacks, there are no guarantees that the number of Byzantine workers can be bounded from above.
Model
We consider the following optimization problem: min
, z is sampled from some unknown distribution D, d is the number of dimensions. We assume that there exists a minimizer of F (x), which is denoted by x * .
We solve this problem in a distributed manner with m workers. In each iteration, each worker will sample n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) data points from the distribution D, and compute the gradient of the local empirical loss F i (x) = 1 n n j=1 f (x; z i,j ), ∀i ∈ [m], where z i,j is the jth sampled data on the ith worker. The servers will collect and aggregate the gradients sent by the works, and update the model as follows:
where Aggr(·) is an aggregation rule (e.g., averaging), and
Formally, we define the Byzantine failures in synchronous SGD as follows.
The set of correct vectors {v i : i ∈ [m]} is partially replaced by Byzantine vectors, which results in {ṽ t i : i ∈ [m]}, whereṽ t i = g i (x t ) as defined in Equation (1) . In other words, a correct/non-Byzantine gradient is ∇F i (x t ), while a Byzantine gradient, marked as " * ", is assigned arbitrary value. We assume that q out of m vectors are Byzantine, where q < m. Furthermore, the indices of Byzantine workers can change across different iterations.
To help understand the Byzantine failures in synchronous SGD, we illustrate a toy example in Figure 1 . 
The red dot represents the Byzantine gradient, whose value isṽ m = ∇F m (x t ), where < 0 is a large negative constant. The blue dashed circle represent the expectation of the true gradient ∇F (x t ). Thus, the averaged gradient, which will be computed by the server, represented by the green dot, is far away from the true gradient, which is harmful to the model training.
Methodology
In contrast to the existing majority-based methods, we compute a score for each candidate gradient estimator by using the stochastic first-order oracle. We rank each candidate gradient estimator based on the estimated descent of the loss function, and the magnitudes. Then, the algorithm aggregates the candidates with highest scores. The score roughly indicates how trustworthy each candidate is.
samples drawn from D, and n r is the batch size of f r (·). E[f r (x)] = F (x). For any update (gradient estimator) u, based on the current parameter x, learning rate γ, and a constant weight ρ > 0, we define its stochastic descendant score as follows:
The score defined in Definition 2 is composed of two parts: the estimated descendant of the loss function, and the magnitude of the update. The score increases when the estimated descendant of the loss function, f r (x) − f r (x − γṽ i ), increases. The score decreases when the magnitude of the update, ṽ i 2 , increases. Intuitively, the larger descendant suggests faster convergence, and the smaller magnitude suggests a smaller step size. Even if a gradient is Byzantine, a smaller step size makes it less harmful and easier to be cancelled by the correct gradients.
Using the score defined above, we establish the following suspicion-based aggregation rule. We ignore the index of iterations, t, for convenience. Definition 3. (Suspicion-based Aggregation) Assume that among the gradient estimators {ṽ i : i ∈ [m]}, q elements are Byzantine, and x is the current value of the parameters. We sort the sequence by using the stochastic descendant score defined in Definition 2, which results in
In other words,ṽ (i) is the vector with the ith highest score in
The proposed aggregation rule, Zeno 1 , aggregates the gradient estimators by taking the average of the first m − b elements in {ṽ (i) : i ∈ [m]} (the gradient estimators with the (m − b) highest scores):
Note that z i 's (in Definition 2) are independently sampled in different iterations. Furthermore, in each iteration, as z i 's are sampled after the arrival of the candidate gradient estimatorsṽ t i , the Byzantine workers cannot obtain the information of f r (·), which means that the Byzantine gradients are independent of f r (·).
Theoretical guarantees
In this section, we prove the convergence of synchronous SGD with Zeno as the aggregation rule under Byzantine failures. We start with the assumptions required by the convergence guarantees. The two basic assumptions are the smoothness of the loss function, and the bounded variance of the (non-Byzantine) gradient estimators.
Assumptions Assumption 1. (Bounded Taylor's Approximation)
We assume that f (x; z) has L-smoothness and µ-lower-bounded Taylor's approximation (also called µ-weak convexity):
where µ ≤ L, and L > 0.
Note that Assumption 1 covers the case of non-convexity by taking µ < 0, non-strong convexity by taking µ = 0, and strong convexity by taking µ > 0. Assumption 2. (Bounded Variance) We assume that in any iteration, any correct gradient estimator
In general, Assumption 2 bounds the variance and the second-order moment of the correct gradients of any sample loss function f (x; z), z ∼ D.
Convergence guarantees
For general functions, including convex and non-convex functions, we provide the following convergence guarantee. The proof can be found in the appendix.
we have
where β is the same as in Theorem 1. Using Zeno, after T iterations, we have
This corollary tells us that using Zeno as the aggregation rule, even if there are Byzantine failures, the convergence rate can be the same as distributed synchronous SGD. The variance decreases when the number of workers m increases, or the estimated number of Byzantine workers b decreases.
Remark 1. There are two practical concerns for the proposed algorithm. First, by increasing the batch size of f r (·) (n r in Definition 2), the stochastic descendant score will be more stable. However, according to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, the convergence rate is independent of the variance of f r . Thus, theoretically we can only use one sample to evaluate the stochastic descendant score. Second, theoretically we need larger ρ for non-convex problems. However, larger ρ makes Zeno less sensitive to the descendant of the loss function, which potentially increases the risk of aggregating harmful candidates. In practice, we can use a small ρ by assuming the local convexity of the loss functions.
Time complexity
Unlike the majority-based aggregation rules, the time complexity of Zeno is not easy to analyze. Note that the convergence rate is independent of the variance of f r , which means that we can use a single sample (n r = 1) to evaluate f r . Furthermore, in general, when evaluating the loss function on a single sample, the time complexity is roughly linear to the number of parameters d. Thus, informally, the time complexity of Zeno is O(dm) for one iteration, which is the same as Mean and Median. Note that the time complexity of Krum is O(dm 2 ).
Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithm. We summarize our results here:
• Compared to the baselines, Zeno shows better convergence when there are more Byzantine workers than non-Byzantine ones.
• Compared to the baselines, Zeno shows better convergence when the Byzantine gradients do not change the magnitude, which makes them less distinguishable from the correct ones.
• Zeno is robust to the choices of the hyperparameters, including the Zeno batch size n r , the weight ρ, and the number of trimmed elements b.
Datasets and evaluation metrics
We conduct experiments on two image classification tasks: handwritten digits classification on MNIST dataset and object recognition on CIFAR-10 dataset. On the MNIST dataset, we use softmax regression for convex optimization, and multi-layer perceptron (MLP) for non-convex optimization.
On the CIFAR-10 dataset, we use convolutional neural network (CNN). The details of the datasets are listed in Table 1 . The details of the neural network structures can be found in the appendix. Due to the space limitation, we only show the results on MNIST dataset with MLP. The additional experiments, including MNIST with softmax regression and CIFAR-10 with CNN, can be found in the appendix.
In each experiment, we launch twenty worker processes. We repeat each experiment ten times and take the average. We use top-1 accuracy on the test sets as the evaluation metric.
Baselines
We use the averaging without failures/attacks as the gold standard, which is referred to as Mean without Byzantine. Note that this method is not affected by b or q. The baseline aggregation rules are Mean, Median, and Krum as defined below.
Definition 4. (Median [19, 20] ) We define the marginal median aggregation rule Median(·) as
} measured by Euclidean distances.
Sign-flipping attack
In this section, we test the Byzantine resilience to the sign-flipping attack, which flips the sign of each victim gradient and enlarges the magnitude. To be more specific, each gradient, if chosen to be Byzantine, will be multiplied by , which results inṽ i = v i , where ≤ −1. We conduct the experiments on MNIST dataset with MLP. The results are shown in Figure 2 . We can see that Zeno outperforms the other aggregation rules. When q is small, Zeno and Krum perform similarly. With large | |, Zeno behaves as if there is no Byzantine failures. Surprisingly, Krum performance well with large q and | |. We explain this phenomenon further in Section 6.5.
Omniscient attack
In this section, we test the Byzantine resilience to the omniscient attack. Such attack sets each Byzantine gradient
We conduct the experiments on MNIST dataset with MLP. The results are shown in Figure 3 . We can see that Zeno outperforms the other aggregation rules. Furthermore, Zeno performs much better than the baselines when there are more Byzantine workers than honest workers (q = 12). Smaller | | slows down the convergence of Zeno. Interestingly, averaging performs well with small q and | |, while Krum diverges with large | | even if 2q ≤ m − 2. We explain this phenomenon further in Section 6.5.
Hyperparameter sensitivity
In this section, we tune the hyperparameters of Zeno, and show how they affect the performance under the sign-flipping attack. The hyperparameters include the batch size n r for evaluating the stochastic descendant score in Definition 2, the weight ρ, and the number of trimmed workers b. The results are shown in Figure 4 . It is shown that larger n r , smaller ρ, larger b and smaller q improve the accuracy. Furthermore, Zeno is generally robust to different n r , b, and q. However, when ρ is too large, with large q Zeno can fail.
Discussion
The experimental results show some interesting heuristics for both attackers and defenders: • The unchanged magnitude (| | = 1) makes the attack more harmful to distance-based algorithms.
When the magnitude of the Byzantine gradients, rescaled by | |, is too large or too small compared to the magnitude of the normal ones, the Byzantine gradients are more easily to be distinguished. Especially, for Krum and Zeno, larger | | improves the performance. Median, based on sorting instead of distances, is not affected by the magnitude. Another exception is Mean. When the correct gradients dominate and | | is small enough, the sum of Byzantine gradients are not large enough to cancel the correct ones. Thus in this special case, standard aggregation actually outperforms current Byzantine-tolerant methods-a failure case that was seemingly missed by earlier methods, as shown in Figure 2 (a), and 3(a).
• Collusion makes the attacks more harmful to majority-based algorithms. For sign-flipping attacks, even when the Byzantine workers dominate, with large | |, Krum can still have good performance. The reason is that Krum aggregates the cluster of gradients, where the gradients inside the cluster are close to each other. When | | gets larger, the sign-flipping attack also makes the Byzantine gradients farther away from each other, which makes them filtered out by Krum. In contrast, under omniscient attacks, all the Byzantine gradients have the same values, which fools Krum. Median, though more robust than Krum, also has the same issue. Note that under omniscient attacks, even when the correct workers dominate (q = 8), Krum can diverge, as shown in Figure 3 (a) and (b). Such phenomenon is not discussed in the original paper [2] .
In general, we find that Zeno is more robust than the current state of the art. Especially, when the Byzantine workers dominate, Zeno is the only one that converges in all experiments. When the correct workers dominate, Median can be an alternative with cheap computation. The computational complexity of Zeno depends on the complexity of inference and the Zeno batch size n r . These additional hyperparameters make direct comparison to standard methods more challenging.
As expected, the empirical results of hyperparameter sensitivity verify most of the theoretical analysis. Interestingly, though the upper bound of error theoretically grows with b, the empirical results show better convergence with larger b. The reason is that, with larger b, Zeno filters out more potentially harmful gradients, which improves the convergence. Furthermore, we find that the sensitivity to Zeno batch size n r is limited, which means that small n r is enough to obtain good convergence. Such a result also indicates that the computational complexity of Zeno can be reduced without influencing the convergence. Zeno is more sensitive to ρ, especially when the Byzantine workers dominate. Typically, we need smaller ρ for better convergence. Once ρ is small enough (e.g., smaller than γ 20 in Figure 4(d) ), further decreasing ρ will not make significant differences.
Conclusion
We propose a novel aggregation rules for synchronous SGD, which takes the weakest assumption that there is at least one honest worker. The algorithm has provable convergence. Our empirical results show good performance in practice. We will apply the proposed method to asynchronous SGD in the future work. 
Preliminaries
We use the following lemma to bound the aggregated vectors. Lemma 1. (Bounded Score) Without loss of generality, we denote the m − q correct elements in
Sorting the correct vectors by the online descendant score, we obtain {v (i) : i ∈ [m − q]}. Thus, we have the following inequality:
or, by flipping the signs on both sides, it is equivalent to
Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction.
Assume that Score γ,ρ (ṽ (i) , x) < Score γ,ρ (v (i) , x). Thus, there are i correct vectors having larger scores thanṽ (i) . However, becauseṽ (i) is the ith element in {ṽ (i) : i ∈ [m]}, there should be at most i − 1 vectors having larger scores than it, which yields a contradiction.
Convergence guarantees
For general non-strongly convex functions and non-convex functions, we provide the following convergence guarantees.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we denote the m − q correct elements in
. Sorting the correct vectors by the online descendant score, we obtain {v (i) : i ∈ [m − q]}. We also sortṽ i by the online descendant score and obtain
According to the definition
By summing up, we have
Using Lemma 1, we have
Combined with Equation 2, we have
We take ρ = βγ 2 2 , where
Thus, if µ ≥ 0, we have ρ = 0, which implies that
Thus, we have
Using the L-smoothness, we have
for ∀i ∈ [m − b]. By summing up, we have
Again, using the L-smoothness and taking γ ≤ 1 L , we have
Conditional onṽ (i) 's, taking expectation w.r.t. f r on both sides, we have
Now, taking the expectation w.r.t.ṽ (i) 's on both sides and using E v (i) 2 ≤ G, we have
Now we just need to bound E ∇F (x) −v 2 . For convenience, we denote g = ∇F (x). Note that for arbitrary subset S ⊆ [m − q], |S| = m − b, we have the following bound:
Putting all the ingredients together, we obtain the desired result
Corollary 1. Take γ = 1 L √ T , and ρ = βγ 2 2 , where β is the same as in Theorem 1. Using Zeno, after T iterations, we have
By telescoping and taking total expectation, we have
Let T > m, and γ = 1 L √ T . Thus, we have
Experimental Details
In Table 2 and 3, we show the detailed network structures of the MLP and CNN used in our experiments. 
Additional Experiments
In this section, we illustrate the additional empirical results.
In Figure 5 In Figure 7 and 8, we show the experiments on CIFAR-10 dataset with CNN. The complexity of the neural networks structure and the dataset enlarge the variance of the gradients, which results worse convergence when there are Byzantine failures. In most cases, Zeno outperforms the baselines. The only exception is in Figure 7 (b). However, we can tune n r and ρ to improve the performance of Zeno.
Another practical concern is that, to execute Zeno, the sever must be able to draw samples from the entire training dataset, which may not be possible due to some privacy-preserving policies. In practice, Zeno can use the samples drawn from an independent validation dataset instead of the training set. In the following experiments, we test the performance of a variant of Zeno, which draws samples from the test set instead of the training set to compute the stochastic descendant scores. Such variant is referred to as Zeno with test set. In Figure 9 and 10, we show the accuracy on MNIST test set with MLP. In Figure 11 and 12, we show the accuracy on MNIST training set with MLP. We can see that using the test set for Zeno will still result in good convergence. In some cases, Zeno with sampling from the test set show better performance than averaging without Byzantine failures. For the training accuracy, Zeno shows similar performance, no matter the samples for the stochastic descendant score are drawn from the test set or the training set. 
